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GET SICK, GET OUT: THE MEDICAL
CAUSES OF HOME MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURES
Christopher Tarver Robertson, Richard Egelhof & Michael
Hoket*
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
In recent years, there has been national alarm about the rising rate
of home foreclosures, which now strike one in every 92 households in
America, and which contribute to even broader macroeconomic ef-
fects.' The handy explanation for the rise in foreclosures is that irres-
ponsible borrowers have been using exotic loan products to purchase
homes they cannot in reality afford.2 Moreover, these buyers allegedly
I Please direct correspondence to Christopher Tarver Robertson at
crobertson@post.harvard.edu. The authors thank Elizabeth Warren for extensive
advice and guidance on this project. We also thank Dean Elena Kagan for generously
funding the project; Einer Elhauge and the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy,
Biotechnology and Bioethics for financial support; Kimberly Breger, Roger Bertling,
Michael Collins, Deborah Thorne, Katherine Porter, Ken Carson, Heidi Williams, and
the Fellows of the Petrie Flom Center for providing insights at various stages of the
project; and Kathy Paras, Kathy Goldstein and especially Jane Wagner for extensive
administrative support. We also thank the many Harvard Law School students who
assembled the survey packages and called those who had not yet responded.
t All survey data referenced in this article is on file with the authors. Please
direct inquiries regarding survey data to Christopher Tarver Robertson at crobert-
son@post.harvard.edu.
1 Press Release, RealtyTrac, More Than 1.2 Million Foreclosure Filings
Reported in 2006 (Jan. 25, 2007), http://www.realtytrac.com/
ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?ChannelD=9&ItemlD=1 855&accnt=64847
(stating that foreclosure struck 1 in 92 households in 2006); Associated Press, Early
Gains Give Way to Small Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2007, at C4 ("Defaults among
subprime mortgage holders - borrowers with weak credit - began the chain of
events that led to the turmoil on Wall Street and other stock markets in recent
weeks."); See David Cho, Huge Mortgage Lender Files for Bankruptcy, WASH. POST,
Apr. 3, 2007, at A l.
2 See Home Wreckers: Who Is To Blame For America's Soaring Mortgage
Foreclosure Rate? CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, at B2 ("Last week, the Mort-
gage Bankers Association reported that mortgage foreclosures hit a record high, and
late mortgage payments hit a 3-year high. The culprits? Risky, nontraditional loans,
high interest rates, unworthy borrowers and predatory lenders in the 'subprime mar-
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relied on optimistic projections for the housing market, and low inter-
est rates, which have not panned out.3 Commentators have also
pointed to lax lending standards and aggressive practices by brokers
as contributing to the increase of high-risk, non-traditional loans that
are more likely to foreclose.4 These factors - loose lending, irrespons-
ible borrowers, a flat real estate market, and rising interest rates -
have together become the "standard account" of home foreclosure.
Policymakers and scholars may be surprised to learn that even in
the midst of this spike, one of the largest causes of home foreclosures
was none of the above. We studied homeowners going through forec-
losure in four states and found that medical crises contribute to half of
all home foreclosure filings. If these patterns hold nationwide, medi-
cal causes may put as many as 1.5 million Americans in jeopardy of
losing their homes each year. If these findings are accurate, they help
ket."'); David Streitfeld, The Mortgage Meltdown: Foreclosure Pace Nears Record
High, L.A. TiMes, Apr. 17, 2007, at CI ("Most of the loans going into default now
were made at the peak of the housing boom in 2005, when some thought the good
times would continue forever and lending standards were lax. Nearly 80% ... had
adjustable rates, a record high. Many of these mortgages required the borrowers to put
little or no money down, and lenders took their word for whatever income they said
they made. For a moment, everything was fine. Then housing prices stopped going
up - meaning that many of these borrowers did not have enough equity or income to
refinance to a new loan. Others in foreclosure may be able to afford the payments,
but have chosen not to make them because their homes are worth less than they
paid."); Alternative Mortgage Products: Testimony Before the Subcomms. on Housing
and Transportation and Economic Policy, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 109th Cong. 1, 7 (2006) [hereinafter Alternative Mortgage Products] (state-
ment of Orice M. Williams, Director, Financial Markets and Community Invest-
ments), available at http:/fbanking.senate.govl files/ACF84D8.pdf (describing the
increasing incidence of alternative mortgage products (AMPs) that allow buyers "to
purchase homes that might otherwise be unaffordable").
3 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. This account is consistent with
the "option theory" of mortgage default in the scholarly literature. See infra notes 39-
43 and accompanying text.
4 See Streitfeld supra note 2; Alternative Mortgage Products, supra note 2,
at 9 ("[S]ome lenders combined AMPs with less stringent income and asset verifica-
tion requirements than traditionally permitted for these products or lent to borrowers
with lower credit scores and higher debt-to-income ratios."); JOINT ECON. COMM.,
110TH CONG., SHELTERING NEIGHBORHOODS FROM THE SUBPRIME FORECLOSURE
STORM 1 (Apr. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.jec.senate.gov/Documents/Reports/subprimel apr2007revised.pdf (Sen.
Charles E. Schumer, Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, issued this special
report that declared, "Over the past several months, it has become increasingly clear
that irresponsible subprime lending practices have been contributing to a wave of
foreclosures that are hitting homeowners and rattling the housing markets.").
5 See Press Release, RealtyTrac, supra note 1; U.S. Census Bureau, House-
holds and Families: 2000, http://factfinder.census.gov/servet/QTTable?_.bm=y&-
geojid=01000US&-qr._name=DEC_2000_SF 1 UQTP1O&-
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explain the bulk of home foreclosures, which have been occurring
with stubborn frequency for a quarter century.6
From the social policy perspective, it is critical that we get the sto-
ry straight, as mortgage foreclosure may be one of the most significant
legal devices, striking millions of Americans,' with dramatic conse-
quences for each one. For individuals, the purchase of a home is often
the largest financial decision they ever make, and the transaction costs
of getting into, and then out of, a mortgage can be onerous. Indeed,
foreclosure can wipe out the homeowners' savings and leave them
owing debt on homes they no longer own.8 A foreclosure also has
pernicious effects for the borrowers' families, neighborhoods, and
local communities. 9 Foreclosures are expensive for lenders, reducing
returns to investors in the secondary mortgage market and increasing
costs to borrowers ex ante.t 0 Finally, foreclosures frustrate the nation-
al goal of home ownership.1
dsname=DEC_2000_SF1LU (last visited Oct. 11, 2007) (noting Table QT-PIO lists
the average household size as 2.59). The 1.2 million foreclosures multiplied by an
average household size of 2.59, yields 3.108 million persons who were subject to
foreclosure filings. The 1.5 million figured is derived by multiplying 3.108 million
by 49%, which is the percentage of respondents in our study who self-identify as
having one of the four core medical causes. See infra Part IV. There is some contro-
versy over the RealtyTrac numbers. See Greta Guest, "RealtyTrac Data Disputed",
DETROrr FREE PRESS, available at
http:l/www.freep.comlapps/pbcs.dlllarticle?AID=/200707231BUSINESS4n0723035
7/1002/BUSINESS (July 23, 2007) (critics, including the Mortgage Bankers Associa-
tion, argue that RealtyTrac's numbers are inflated due to counting multiple filings for
the same property).
6 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., PROVIDING ALTERNATIVES
TO MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, at vii (1996), available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfin/mortgage.htmil ("The percentage of U.S.
homeowners with serious delinquency problems has been at chronic levels since
1983 .... On the dark side, the statistics of the past 15 years represent 3 million
American families who not only faced the financial and emotional specter of being
forced from their homes, but who also suffered loss of access to credit.").
7 See calculations supra note 5.
8 Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws,
77 VA. L. REv. 489, 493-94 (1991) ("One of the primary objectives of mortgage fo-
reclosure law is to have the sheriff, judge, or trustee sell the property for a price that
equals its fair market value. For several reasons, however, this rarely occurs....
When the foreclosure sale price is less than the debt owed to the mortgagee, the mort-
gagee may proceed against the borrower for a deficiency judgment in the amount of
the shortfall if the terms of the loan allow such an action.").
9 See JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 4, at 16 (citing studies that show
every new home foreclosure can cost stakeholders up to $80,000, when adding up the
costs to homeowners ($7,200), lenders ($50,000), neighbors ($1,508), and local gov-
ernments ($19,227)).
10 See Desiree Hatcher, Foreclosure Alternatives: A Case for Preserving
Homeownership, PROFITWISE NEWS AND ViEws, Feb. 2006, at 2, 2 (in 2003, lenders
20081
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To explore the causes of home foreclosure, we conducted a survey
of homeowners on the brink of foreclosure, those who have (alleged-
ly) defaulted on their loans and whose lenders have initiated legal
foreclosure proceedings.' 2 Most fundamentally, we simply asked
homeowners what factors contributed to their defaults, but we sup-
plemented this data with additional questions about their objective
situations and with publicly-accessible data about their homes.
This preliminary study reveals that the standard account is, at
best, an inadequate understanding of the causes of mortgage de-
faults. 13 We found homeowners that tended to have significant equity
in their homes and reasonable ratios between their income and their
mortgage debt burdens. Few reported that their loans were unafforda-
ble and only about a third said increasing mortgage payments were a
factor in their defaults. From the surface, these respondents appear to
be able to afford their homes and have no reason to walk away from
them. So why are they in default?
Our evidence suggests that medical disruptions are a major con-
tributor to mortgage default, often striking in combination with other
factors. Half of all respondents (49%) indicated that their foreclosure
was caused in part by a medical problem, including illness or injuries
(32%), unmanageable medical bills (23%), lost work due to a medical
problem (27%), or caring for sick family members (14%). We also
examined objective indicia of medical disruptions in the previous two
years, including those respondents paying more than $2,000 of medi-
cal bills out of pocket (37%), those losing two or more weeks of work
because of injury or illness (30%), those currently disabled and unable
to work (8%), and those who used their home equity to pay medical
bills (13%). Altogether, we found that about 7 in 10 of our respon-
dents either self-reported a medical cause of foreclosure, or expe-
rienced one of these indicia of medical disruptions in the years before
foreclosure. In many cases, homeowners were hit with a perfect storm
of factors - a few thousand dollars of medical bills, a few weeks of
incurred approximately $25 billion in foreclosure-related costs).
'" See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2000) (allowing deduction from taxable income
of interest paid on acquisition and home equity indebtedness on a qualified residence,
which effectively reduces the interest rate on the mortgage by as much as the taxpay-
er's marginal federal income tax rate); J. COMM. ON TAX'N, SELECTED DATA RELATED
TO THE FEDERAL TAX SYsTEM, JCX-I1-07, at 8 tbl.5 (2007), available at
http://www.house.gov/jctlx-11-07.pdf (The mortgage interest deduction will cost the
Federal government $402.7 billion over the five-year period from 2006 to 2010).
.2 See infra Part II for a full discussion of the research methodology.
13 See infra Part HI for a full discussion of the findings.
[Vol. 18:65
GET SICK: GET OUT
missed work, and perhaps a divorce or rising interest rate - all com-
bined to push them over the edge into foreclosure.
Our findings provide a more textured account of the reality of
home foreclosure, and provide new evidence of middle class financial
insecurity. If these findings can be replicated by more comprehensive
future studies, they will suggest broad policy reforms and reassess-
ment of the narrowly-focused legal regime that lenders use to facili-
tate foreclosures. In addition to the current focus on structural adjust-
ments, which force people out of homes they cannot afford, policy-
makers should consider insurance-related interventions, which could
help homeowners bridge temporary difficulties caused by medical
crises. We also present a legal proposal for staying foreclosure pro-
ceedings during verifiable medical crises, as a way to protect home-
owners and to minimize the negative externalities of foreclosure.
We begin in Section I by providing a primer on foreclosure law
and a review of some of the literature on financial distress. In Section
II, we outline our research methodology, and we present our results in
Section Ell. We conclude with some thoughts on policy reforms and
future research possibilities.
I. FORECLOSURE LAW AND THE LITERATURE
ON FINANCIAL DISTRESS
In general terms, a mortgage foreclosure occurs when a borrower
breaches the contract with his or her lender, who then invokes state
laws that culminate in the sale of the property in order to recoup at
least some of the balance on the loan. 14 Although all states allow a
lender to bring an action in court that would lead to such an eventual
sale, most states allow for a lender to sell the property without involv-
ing a court whatsoever, as long as the borrower agreed to such a pro-
cedure in the loan contract ex ante.15 We chose the four states we sur-
veyed - Florida, New Jersey, California and Illinois -- in part to re-
flect a diversity of state law foreclosure proceedings, and to ensure
that there would be enough time for the surveys to reach participants
before their homes were sold. See Table 1.
14 See Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the
Fairness and Efficiency of Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 639, 643 (1997) (explaining the consequences of defaulting on mortgage
payments and discussing the basic features in statutory schemes of state foreclosure
laws). See Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage
Credit, 88 REv. ECON. & STAT. 177 (2006), for a complete discussion on the relation-
ship between state law and foreclosure.
15 Schill, supra note 8, at 492-93.
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California Non-judicial Up to 4 No
months
Florida Judicial 4 to 6 months Yes
Illinois Judicial 9 months to 2 Noyears
New Jer- Judicial 8 to 12 No
sey months
Foreclosures in California can be either judicial or non-judicial.' 6
A judicial foreclosure is required if the mortgagee seeks a deficiency
judgment, but the process is slower and more costly than non-judicial
foreclosure. 17 When the mortgagee uses judicial foreclosure to seek a
deficiency, the mortgagor receives a right of redemption effective for
one year following sale, which does not exist for non-judicial foreclo-
sures.' 8 For these reasons, almost all mortgage foreclosures are non-
judicial, and typically take less than four months. 19 Under California
law, a mortgagee must file a notice of default with the county record-
er, who mails the affected parties at least 110 days before the sale, and
notice of the sale must be published at least 20 days before the sale.2°
The mortgagor has a right to reinstate his mortgage up until five days
before the sale by paying the amount in default plus costs associated
with foreclosure. 2' Although most mortgage contracts include an "ac-
celeration clause" whereby the entire amount of the mortgage comes
due upon default, in California, the mortgagor is not required to pay
16 MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFREY R. DWYER & STEVEN W. BENDER, THE
LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 17:9.
17 A deficiency judgment is a claim against the borrower personally for the
unsecured portion of the debt, which remains after the collateral exhausted.
18 CAL. CIV. CODE § 726(e) (West Supp. 2007).
19 ANDREA LEE NEGRONI, JOHN P. KROMER & MARY M. PFAFF, RESIDENTIAL
MORTGAGE LENDING: STATE REGULATION MANUAL WEST, CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE
LENDING § 2:19 (Aug. 2007) available at RML-SRW CA s 2:19 (Westlaw).
20 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 2924(a), 2924f (West 1993 & Supp. 2007).
21 §§ 2924c(a), (e).
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the accelerated debt in order to reinstate the mortgage. All foreclo-
sures in Florida are accomplished through judicial proceedings with-
out a jury,22 and usually take three to six months.23 There is no notice
required prior to the filing of court proceedings, but the court may
require that the lender effectuate personal service on the borrower.
24
The sale of property usually occurs between twenty to thirty-five days
following judgment. 25 Generally, the mortgagor has a right to redeem
the property any time before the filing of a certificate of sale by pay-
ing the entire amount due under the judgment or under the security
interest plus any other amounts due including acceleration and costs
including attorney's fees.26 Otherwise there is no right of redemp-
27tion.
All foreclosures in Illinois occur through judicial proceedings,28
and usually take nine months, but can take up to two years if a mort-
gagor mounts a defense. 29 For three months after receiving a foreclo-
sure notice, a mortgagor can prevent foreclosure through reinstate-
ment by curing all defaults. 30 For this right to be invoked, the mortga-
gor does not have to pay any accelerated indebtedness, but must pay
the portion of the principal that was due at the time of the default plus
additional accumulated expenses needed to make the account cur-
rent.3' A residential homeowner also has a right of redemption for
22 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.01 (West 1994).
23 MADISON ET AL. supra note 16 at § 20:2.
24 "The requirement of personal service on the borrower sometimes entails
extraordinary efforts to locate the borrower." ANDREA LEE NEGRONI, ET AL.,
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDING: STATE REGULATION MANUAL SOUTH EASTERN,
FLORIDA MORTGAGE LENDING, § 2:19 (Nov. 2007), available at RML-SRSE FL s
2:19 (Westlaw).
25 Although Florida law does not mandate any procedure, it does provide a
procedure that can be used, and courts generally follow those procedures. FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45.031 (West 2006). See MADISON ET ALsupra note 16 at § 20:2.
26 § 45.0315.
27 NEGRONI, ET AL., supra note 19 at § 2:19.
28 Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1102
(West 2003). In certain circumstances where the lenders are willing to forgo a defi-
ciency judgment claim and the mortgagor waives her rights to reinstatement and
redemption, a mortgagee and mortgagor can agree to a "consent foreclosure" which
accelerates the process. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/15-1402 (West 2003).
29 See generally Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/15-1101 to -1706 (West 2003); ILLINOIS ATTORNEY DESK REFERENCE
MANUAL, HOUSING LAW: MORTGAGE FOREcLoSURE (2003), available at
http://www.illinoislegalaid.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.dsp-content&contentID=
327. (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
30 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/15-1602. This right is only available once every
five years. § 5/15-1602.
3" ANDREA LEE NEGRONI, ET AL., RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDING: STATE
20091
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seven months after she receives notice, or three months after the date
of entry of a judgment of foreclosure, whichever is later.32 In order to
redeem property, the mortgagee must pay all of the remaining prin-
cipal due, plus costs and fees. There are additional protections for
high-risk home loans, most importantly a one time per loan opportuni-
ty for a mortgagor to delay foreclosure for 30 days by seeking credit
counseling.
All foreclosures in New Jersey occur via judicial proceedings,34
usually a public sale,35 and typically take eight to twelve months.36
New Jersey law requires that the mortgagee provide a notice of inten-
tion to foreclose thirty days prior to commencement of proceedings,
or acceleration. 37 The mortgagor can reinstate their loan by paying the
entire amount in default plus court costs and attorneys' fees. The
mortgagor does not need to pay accelerated indebtedness to invoke the
reinstatement right. The right to reinstate exists at any time up to the
entry of final judgment, usually 10 days after the sale. 38
Much has been written about mortgage default, medical debt, and
families in financial distress, but there is surprisingly little borrower-
reported data regarding medical crises as trigger events for mortgage
foreclosure. Most theoretical discussion of mortgage default is
founded on the theory that borrowers have the option of whether to
make the mortgage payment, refinance the loan, or default on the loan
REGULATION MANUAL NORTH CENTRAL, ILLINOIS MORTGAGE LENDING, § 2:19 (Aug.
2007), available at RML-SRNCN IL s 2:19 (Westlaw).
32 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/15-1603. If the mortgagee is the purchaser at the
sale and the sale price was less than the amount previously required to redeem the
property, the mortgagor can redeem for an additional 30-day period after the date the
sale is confirmed by paying to the mortgagee the sale price plus all related costs,
expenses, and interest. § 5/15-1603.
33 Residential Mortgage License Act of 1987, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 38, §
1050.1280 (2007); NEGRONI, ET AL., supra note 31 at § 2:19.
34 Although other types of foreclosure may still be "theoretically possible,"
judicial foreclosures are the only type of foreclosure method used in practice. 5
BAXTER DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 76:19 (14th release
2006).
35 A mortgagee can initiate an optional procedural where the mortgage debt
is deemed satisfied without sale when the residential property has been abandoned,
has no equity, or where the lender takes a deed in lieu of foreclosure. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:50-63 (2000). It is anticipated that the use of this procedure will not be
widespread. 5 DUNAWAY, supra note 34, § 76:25.
36 ANDREA LEE NEGRONI, ET AL., RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDING: STATE
REGULATION MANUAL NORTH CENTRAL, ILLINOIS MORTGAGE LENDING, § 2:19 (Aug.
2007), available at RML-SRNCN IL s 2:19 (Westlaw).
37 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:50-56 (2007).
38 A mortgagee can reinstate a particular loan only once every 18 months. §
2A:50-57.
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and allow the lender to take the property.39 Much of the academic
debate has centered on whether the choice made by the borrower un-
der the "option theory" is "ruthless" with only the value of the mort-
gage and the fair market value of the home considered,n" or whether
the choice includes other borrower-related issues such as loss in in-
come or medical crisis. 41 Despite the significant economic literature
on the subject, further empirical research is needed to study "trigger
events, such as divorce and death" and whether "some defaults [are]
driven by a sudden drop or loss of income caused by unemployment
or job loss or by a sudden increase in expenses, such as medical or
legal fees[.]"' ' 2
There is some empirical data on borrower-level crisis and mort-
gage default, and in recent years this data has shed some doubt on the
"option theory" account. Quercia, McCarthy, and Stegman analyzed
data from Farmers Home Administration borrowers and found that
contemporaneous net equity had no effect on default rates whereas
income to payment ratios and the existence of crisis events had a sig-
nificant effect on default.43 In another study, Quercia, Cowan, and
Moreno analyzed data from 4,200 borrowers who received credit
counseling in Minneapolis-Saint Paul between 1991 and 2003. The
researchers found that while health problems were a cause of foreclo-
39 For a comprehensive (though now dated) review of the traditional litera-
ture of mortgage default, see Roberto G. Quercia and Michael A. Stegman, Residen-
tial Mortgage Default: A Review of the Literature, 3 J. HOUSING RES. 341 (1992); see
also Kerry D. Vandell, How Ruthless is Mortgage Default? A Review and Synthesis of
the Evidence, 6 J. HOUSING RES. 245 (1995) (analyzing a variety of models and theo-
ries and determining that the "frictionless option-theoretic models" are the most use-
ful); see also Stark, supra note 14, at 640 n.3 (describing law review literature that
discusses preliminary empirical studies of foreclosures in various locations).
40 See James B. Kau, Donald C. Keenan & Taewon Kim, Default Probabili-
ties for Mortgages, 35 J. URB. EcON. 278, 278 (1994) (suggesting that transaction
costs play little or no role in mortgage default decisions); See also Gordon W. Craw-
ford & Eric Rosenblatt, Efficient Mortgage Default Option Exercise: Evidence from
Loss Severity, 10 J. REAL EST. RES. 543 (1995).
41 John M. Quigley & Robert Van Order, Explicit Tests of Contingent Claims
Models of Mortgage Default, 11 J. REAL EST. FN. AND ECON. 99, 100 (1995) (stating
that if homeowners are rational, transactions costs, such as reputation costs, are
needed to explain default behavior). See also Brent W. Ambrose & Charles A. Ca-
pone, Modeling the Conditional Probability of Foreclosure in the Context of Single-
Family Mortgage Default Resolutions, 26 REAL EST. EcON. 391 (1996) (arguing that
trigger events can lead to foreclosure even for borrowers with positive equity, who are
unable to raise cash or to sell the property).
42 Vandell, supra note 39, at 259.
43 Roberto G. Quercia, George W. McCarthy & Michael A. Stegman, Mort-




sures, those causes were in decline from 25% to 20%, while causes
such as job loss or money management had increased.44 In 2005, Col-
lins conducted one of the few mailed surveys concerning mortgage
foreclosure, surveying 299 predominantly minority, low income
households in Chicago, and found that 33% of respondents listed
medical problems as a cause for their foreclosure.4 5 And in early 2007,
Freddie Mac presented basic analysis on the chief causes of mortgage
delinquency from the borrower's perspective, with loss of income the
biggest cause, 36% in 2006, and illness ranking second, 21% in
2006.46 The Freddie Mac study asks for, and reports, only the "chief'
cause of mortgage delinquency for each respondent, and mortgage
delinquency is a stage prior to initiation of foreclosure proceedings.
Together, these studies suggest that medical crises may account for
one quarter to one third of mortgage foreclosures, but none of them
have explored the ways that various causes interact, nor explored oth-
er medical causes in depth, such as the amounts of un-reimbursed
medical bills each respondent paid.
Beyond the context of mortgage foreclosures, medical debt has
been studied and linked to a weakening of housing security.47 Various
studies by nonprofit advocacy organizations have shown that medical
debt can lead to housing problems such as difficulty acquiring housing
44 Roberto G. Quercia, Spencer M. Cowan & Ana Moreno, The Cost-
Effectiveness of Community-Based Foreclosure Prevention 21 (Joint Center for Hous-
ing Studies of Harvard University, Working Paper, Paper No. BABC 04-18, 2004),
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/babc/babe 04-18.pdf.
45 j. Michael Collins, Exploring the Design of Financial Counseling for
Mortgage Borrowers in Default, 28 J. FAm. & ECON. IsSUES 207, 208, 213 tbl.2
(2007). The study was focused on the effectiveness of mortgage counseling. Id. at
208. Clients with injuries and medical problems were less likely to use telephone
counseling only and more likely to use both face-to-face and telephone counseling.
Id. at 213 tbl.2.
46 See Press Release, Freddie Mac, 2006 Drop in Delinquencies Show Shift-
ing Reasons Behind Single Family Late Payments, Says Freddie Mac (Apr. 25, 2007),
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/servicing/2007/20070425_singlefamily.
html.
47 See, e.g., ROBERT W. SEIFERT, HOME SICK: How MEDICAL DEBT
UNDERMINES HOUSING SECURITY 1 (The Access Project 2005). See also MICHELLE M.
DOTY, JENNIFER N. EDWARDS & ALYSSA L. HOLMGREN, SEEING RED: AMERICANS
DRIVEN INTO DEBT BY MEDICAL BILLS 3 (The Commonwealth Fund, 2005), available
at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usrdoc/837_Dotyseeing redmedicaldebt.p
df?section=4039 (analyzing the hardships faced by those unable to pay medical bills
including taking out loans against their homes); Cathy Schoen, Michelle M. Doty,
Sara R. Collins & Alyssa L. Holmgren, Insured but Not Protected: How Many Adults
are Underinsured?, W5 HEALTH AFFAIRS 289, 296 (2005),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.289v 1.
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due to poor credit and missing rent or mortgage payments.48 In one
study, one-quarter of families with at least one member lacking insur-
ance reported having to "change their way of life significantly" to pay
medical bills.49 In 2005, Watson et al. studied 383 people in St. Louis,
Missouri, finding that 53% of their respondents owed medical debt.5°
Of those with medical debt, 31% reported that the debt resulted in
housing problems.51 Pryor and Gurewich conducted a similar study in
2003 of 342 clients at two community health centers in Boston, Mas-
sachusetts. 2 They found that 41% of respondents reported having
medical debt, with 53% of that group reporting that it caused housing
problems.53 Zeldin and Rukavina reported that in a phone survey of
low to middle income households, those with medical expenses in the
prior year had a higher average credit card debt than those who did
not cite any medical expenses.54 Although some of the studies note in
passing that "[p]eople who owe medical bills often find themselves in
court... sometimes leading to foreclosure, 55 the relationship between
mortgage foreclosure and medical distress remains underdeveloped.
48 SEIFERT, supra note 47, at 1; DOTY, supra note 47, at 3; Schoen, supra
note 47, at 296.
49 LISA DUCHON ET AL, SECURITY MATTERS: How INSTABILITY IN HEALTH
INSURANCE PUTS U.S. WORKERS AT RISK 11, 16 chartl7 (The Commonwealth Fund,
2001) available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usrdoc/duchon-securitymatters_512.pdfsection
=4039. The figure rises to nearly 40% when none of the family members are insured.
Id.
50 SIDNEY D. WATSON, MARGARIDA JORGE, ANDREW COHEN & ROBERT W.
SEIFERT, LIVING IN THE RED: MEDICAL DEBT AND HOUSING SECURITY IN MISSOURI 1,
22 (The Access Project, 2007), available at
http://www.accessproject.org/adobe/living-in-Lhe_.red.pdf.
51 This remained significant even with low amounts of debt, as 15% of the
respondents with medical debt under $500 and 27% with debt between $500 and
$1,000 reported housing problems. Id. at 1.
52 CAROL PRYOR & DEBORAH GUREWICH, GETTING CARE BUT PAYING
THE PRICE: How MEDICAL DEBT LEAVES MANY IN MASSACHUSETTS FACING TOUGH
CHOICES 13 (The Access Project, February 2004), available at
http://www.accessproject.org/downloads/MAreport.pdf.
" Id. at 6.
54 CINDY ZELDIN & MARK RUKAVINA, BORROWING TO STAY HEALTHY: HOW
CREDIT CARD DEBT IS RELATED TO MEDICAL EXPENSES 4-5 (2007), available at
http://www.demos.org/pubs/healthyweb.pdf.
55 Seifert, supra note 47, at 9 (citing GRACE ROLLINS, UNCHARITABLE CARE:
YALE-NEw HAVEN HOSPITAL'S CHARITY CARE AND COLLECrIONS PRACTICES (Con-
necticut Center for a New Economy, January 2003)); See also, Lucette Lagnado,
Twenty Years and Still Paying, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2003, at BI (describing the
effect of aggressive collection practices used by hospitals); cf. Lucette Lagnado, Full
Price: A Young Woman, an Appendectomy, and a $19,000 Debt, WALL ST. J., Mar.
17, 2003, at Al (depicting the economic troubles that resulted after a young woman
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The Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP) provides a successful
model for studying families in financial distress, drawing data from
bankruptcy records, written surveys, and telephone interviews in
1981, 1991, 2001 and now 2007 forthcoming. 5 The CBP originally
used only court records to link medical bills to bankruptcies. 57 How-
ever by 2001, it had become routine for debtors to pay medical bills
with credit cards, which would be listed as general debt in court
records and would not be traceable to a medical cause. Given this gap
and other developments, the researchers also began using written and
telephone surveys to acquire information from the debtors themselves,
as we did in the present study.
Jacoby & Warren reported that 46% of debtors in the 2001 survey
self-identified a medical cause for their bankruptcy, with 21% of deb-
tors in the written survey reporting missing at least 2 weeks of work
due to a medical injury and 26% reporting having medical bills in
excess of $1000 that were not covered by insurance in the two years
before filing for bankruptcy. 58 Jacoby & Warren posited that perhaps
63% of the debtors they surveyed had a medical-related bankruptcy.59
In a widely cited article also based on the 2001 dataset and sup-
plemented by in-depth interviews with respondents who indicated
medical causes of their bankruptcies, Himmelstein, Warren, Thorne
and Woolhandler concluded that about 2 million Americans (includ-
underwent surgery without medical insurance).
56 See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT
IN AMERICA 168 (1989) (reporting CBP survey data); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA
WARREN TYAGi, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND
FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 181-88 (2003); Robert M. Lawless & Elizabeth Warren,
The Myth of the Disappearing Business Bankruptcy, 93 CAL. L. REV. 743, 769 (2005)
(describing phases of data collection for the CBP). The project was initiated by
Professors Teresa Sullivan, Jay Westbrook, and Elizabeth Warren in 1981 and 1991.
By 2001, the team expanded to include Professors David Himmelstein, Robert
Lawless, Katherine Porter, John Pottow, Deborah Thorne, Susan Wachter, Steffie
Woolhandler, then-Professor and now-Judge Bruce Markell, and then-Professor and
now-Dean Michael Schill. The CBP has conducted its most recent survey in 2007,
and results are forthcoming. Many of the questions in our survey were based on the
CBP's draft survey, and we are grateful to the entire team.
57 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 56.
58 Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An
Alternative Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 Nw U. L. REV. 535,
548-49, 551 (2006).
59 Id. at 552 fig.3. Jacoby and Warren noted that not all researchers would
agree with what they included under the realm of medical-related bankruptcy, and
presented the data under alternative calculations, but concluded that "[b]y any analy-
sis, this study finds a substantial number of families filing for bankruptcy in part to
deal with the fallout from medical problems." Id., at 551
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ing filers and their dependents) suffered medical bankruptcies in a one
year period.60 Medical bankruptcies are not static; these authors esti-
mated that the phenomenon had grown twenty-fold since the prelimi-
nary study in 1981.61
The present empirical study of mortgage foreclosure provides a
useful supplement to the bankruptcy data, as an alternative measure of
financial distress in America. In sheer numbers, in 2006, mortgage
foreclosures affected a larger cross-section of America, striking at
about double the rate of bankruptcies. 62 Federal bankruptcy is an "im-
perfect proxy for financial ruin"63 because it is a voluntary proceeding
initiated by the debtor himself or herself, who therefore must have the
financial and personal wherewithal to take this rather drastic reme-
dy.64 Moreover, bankruptcy is only attractive to those who have non-
exempt assets or income that they are seeking to protect from credi-
tors, and who have the cash on hand to pay an attorney to prepare and
submit the filing. The most destitute Americans face financial distress
without bankruptcy protection.
In contrast, foreclosure proceedings are involuntary for the deb-
tors, as they are initiated by lenders at their own discretion, and the
holder of a security interest on a house can exercise it, regardless of
whether the homeowner has exempt equity therein. 65 As the bankrupt-
6o David U. Himmelstein et al., Market Watch: illness And Injury As Contri-
butors To Bankruptcy, W5 HEALTH AFFAIRS 63,63 (2005),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.63vl. Compare Himmelstein et
al. which used a narrower definition of medical bankruptcy, finding that 54.5% had
medical causes, in contrast to the 63% in Jacoby and Warren supra note 58.61 Himmelstein et al., supra note 60, at 71.
62 Compare Press Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bank-
ruptcy Filings Plunge in Calendar Year 2006 (Apr. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/bankruptcyfilings041607.html (announcing
that 617,660 bankruptcy cases where filed in 2006) with Press Release, RealtyTrac,
supra note 1 (announcing 1.2 million foreclosure filings in 2006). Note, however,
that 2006 was an odd year for both bankruptcies and foreclosures, with a dramatic
decrease in bankruptcies following passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 and a dramatic increase in foreclosures. See id.
63 Himmelstein et al., supra note 60, at 71.
64 It is possible for creditors to file an involuntary petition for bankruptcy,
however this is an extremely rare occurrence generally, and even more rare for con-
sumers. David S. Kennedy, James E. Bailey, III, R. Spencer Clift, 111, The Involunta-
ry Bankruptcy Process: A Study of the Relevant Statutory and Procedural Provisions
and Related Matters, 31 U. MEM. L. REv. 1, 3 (2000) (In 1998 "less than 1/1000 of
one percent of all bankruptcy cases filed were commenced involuntarily." (citation
omitted)).
65 This voluntary versus involuntary distinction only focuses on the legal
filing itself. Whether individuals are forced into financial distress by exogenous fac-
tors is a distinct, though more fundamental, question.
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cy authors acknowledge, "many people financially ruined by illness
are undoubtedly too ill, too destitute, or too demoralized to pursue
formal bankruptcy. 66 These people, on the other hand, will show up
in the foreclosure filings, although they may or may not respond to
our surveys. Indeed, only one third of our respondents (34%) reported
that they had ever in the past declared bankruptcy, and only 15% of
the total respondents had either "tried," or were planning to declare
bankruptcy as a solution to their impending foreclosure. By sampling
a different population than other studies, our survey helps complete
the picture of financial distress in America.
67
On the other hand, our foreclosure study is in some ways more
limited than the bankruptcy studies. Mortgage foreclosure is obvious-
ly limited to homeowners, while bankruptcies cover both homeowners
and renters. Another significant weakness of our data compared to the
ongoing bankruptcy studies is that we only have a snapshot in time of
four states rather than a national sample repeated several times over a
quarter century. 68 Thus, we are unable to control for geographic varia-
tions and measure longitudinal changes over time.
II. RESEARCH METHOD
We mailed surveys to 2,000 homeowners in four states: Califor-
nia, Florida, Illinois and New Jersey.69 We chose these states primari-
ly in an attempt to reach people in a broad range of geographic, life-
cycle and socio-economic situations, though we were also constrained
by data availability, and certain features of particular state foreclosure
laws. Geographically, these states include both coasts, the north and
the south, and the interior of America. As for life cycles, in America,
12.4% of the population is over 65 years of age, and two of our states,
Florida and New Jersey, are above this average while two others, Cal-
66 Himmelstein et al., supra note 60, at 71.
67 See Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcy and State Collections: The Case Of
The Missing Garnishments, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 603, 606 (2006) (studying state law
debt collection defendants and arguing that "[i]f we are to understand the extent of
consumer financial distress, we must look beyond bankruptcy").
68 The CBP has only this year undertaken a national sample. In previous
years, it used a selection of individual judicial districts around the country. See gen-
erally sources cited at note 58 supra.
69 We obtained funding and supplies sufficient to mail 2000 surveys, and we
estimated that our response rate might be high enough to justify sending 500 surveys
to any given state. So we selected four states to survey. Because we wanted a signifi-
cant number of returns from each state, we did not weight them according to popula-
tion in our mailings, but rather weighted the final results when making national com-
parisons.
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ifornia and Illinois, are below.70 Except for Florida, these states have
higher median home values than the national median of $119,600, but
these states, again except for Florida, also have higher median in-
comes than the national median of $44,434. So, while these states
include a reasonable cross-section of America, future studies should
aim to be more comprehensive, and scientifically representative.
We also selected these states out of sheer practicality. In some
states, foreclosures proceed from notice to disposition too quickly and
the filings are not publicly accessible quickly enough to survey the
homeowners by mail.71 As a result, we focused on states where the
notices of foreclosure were readily accessible within days of the fil-
ings, but where the homeowners would still likely be in the homes for
several weeks, during which they could receive and respond to our
survey. There is a potential source of selection bias here - states with
quicker foreclosure procedures could make foreclosure less expensive
for lenders, and therefore cause them to turn more readily to this re-
medy. Thus, the potential survey populations in those states could
have different characteristics than the ones we surveyed. This problem
could be explored and remedied by future studies using telephone
surveys instead of mail.
We obtained names, addresses, and basic property information for
recent mortgage default notices from the Westlaw real property pre-
foreclosure database for each state. The Westlaw databases contain
information filed with the county clerk or recorder in select counties
that relates to court filings for foreclosures or notices of default. Most
of the information is usually provided by the party filing with the
clerk-generally, the mortgage lender attempting to foreclose on the
mortgage.
On November 27, 2006, we extracted all mortgage foreclosure
records for single-family properties and residential condominiums that
had been recorded within the previous 30 days from the appropriate
pre-foreclosure databases.72 Seeking only to survey homeowners, we
70 U.S. Census Bureau, QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/ (last
visited Oct. 26, 2007) (use drop down box to view a particular state's census informa-
tion).
71 For example, we considered surveying homeowners in Texas, but foreclo-
sures in Texas can be completed within 21 days of the initial court filing. Many of the
counties submit their data only bi-weekly. To get enough foreclosure notices in Tex-
as, we would have had to use records that had been filed in court almost a month
before we queried the database. By the time our survey would have reached the mail-
ing address, it is likely that many of the homeowners would already have been forced
from their homes. As a result, we were unable to survey homeowners in Texas.
72 To obtain enough records from New Jersey, we had to extract records for
the previous 60 days. We obtained 6577 records from California, 1679 from Florida,
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filtered out commercial and investment properties by keeping only
records for which the defendant mailing address was the same as the
property address.73 We then randomly selected 500 records from each
state to receive surveys.
74
We designed our survey packet to maximize the response rate,
and included a one dollar gift to encourage participation.75 The survey
instrument was designed to be easily readable,76 and we circulated
drafts for comment to bankruptcy attorneys who regularly work with
these populations. 7 The survey was six pages, covering a variety of
761 from Illinois, and 900 from New Jersey. Because counties update their data on
different schedules (a few update daily, many update weekly or biweekly, some up-
date monthly, and a handful update only bi-monthly), the median record date varied
by state and some counties were disproportionately represented in our initial data
extraction. The median recording date for the California data was November 7, it was
November 2 for Florida and Illinois, and it was October 19 for the New Jersey data.
73 A small number of institutional defendants made it through this filter, but
we identified them by visual inspection after the survey sample had been selected.
After filtering, we had 4348 records from California, 856 from Florida, 540 from
Illinois, and 739 from New Jersey.
74 We sampled 500 from each state for simplicity, though it implies that
some states were over-sampled and others were under-sampled. Our subsequent com-
parisons across states rely on appropriately weighted averages. See for example infra
note 84.
75 We printed cover letters on high-bond, color Harvard Law School letter-
head, and all three authors signed each of the 2000 letters in blue ink. The letter men-
tioned our advisor, Professor Elizabeth Warren, by title and name, and mentioned that
she had published well-known books and has appeared on the popular Dr. Phil televi-
sion show. We hand-stamped both the outer and return envelopes with brightly-
colored stamps, and we included a crisp, new one-dollar bill in each packet. We
strongly emphasized the confidentiality of the responses. We also attempted to call
every recipient who had not yet responded, encouraging them to complete the survey
on the telephone. In short, we followed the techniques shown to increase survey re-
sponse rates. See generally, DON DILLMAN, MAIL AND INTERNET SURVEYS: THE
TAILORED DESIGN, SECOND EDITION (2007).
76 For example, we presented respondents with 21 possible contributing
causes and asked them to check all factors that contributed to their default, but we
were worried that respondents would be less inclined to read the entire list and to
check causes further down on the list. Therefore, we broke the question into five sub-
questions, each containing a list of four or five answer options. Unfortunately, we did
not randomize or vary the order of the response options across individual surveys in
order to test this potential source of bias. Nonetheless, the 'standard account' factors,
as we are calling them, (i.e., "amount due for monthly mortgage payment increased",
and "loan was not affordable from the beginning") were the first two options listed,
while the medical factors, which we are exploring as an alternative hypothesis, were
in slots six through nine. Thus, any such bias towards the top of the list, or towards
either end of the list would make our findings more significant. The second-most
popular response ("had to pay unexpected expenses., at 49% of respondents) was
in slot fifteen, suggesting that if there is a bias in this regard, it is modest.
77 We also placed a notice in Spanish at the top of the first page asking Span-
[Vol. 18:65
GET SICK: GET OUT
issues and collecting basic demographic data, and included a blank
page at the end to allow respondents to explain their situation in great-
er detail.
We sent the surveys by first-class mail. We received 113 com-
pleted survey responses in the mail. An additional six surveys were
returned by the recipients without responses, and 187 were returned
by the post office marked "address unknown," perhaps because the
residents failed to prevent foreclosure and were evicted, without leav-
ing a forwarding address. To increase our overall response rate, we
called all of the non-respondents for whom we could obtain phone
numbers. 78 Fifteen people answered the survey over the phone, bring-
ing our total response count to 128, for a response rate of 7% (128
responses of 1813 valid postal addresses).79
To check for bias in our relatively small number of responses, we
obtained data from a website that compiles real-estate property data,
Zillow.com, on most of the 2000 properties we had randomly selected
to receive surveys.80 According to the data from Zillow.com, our res-
pondents had a mean/median home value of $324,581 / $250,063,
whereas our non-respondents had a mean value of $349,065 /
$283,726 - a difference of about $25,000, but not statistically signif-
icant even at as low as the 80% confidence level. There were also no
significant differences between respondents and non-respondents at
the state level.8' We also found no statistically significant differences
ish speakers to check a box and return the survey even if they were unable to com-
plete it. We received no such returns.
78 The Westlaw pre-foreclosure database records do not contain phone num-
bers for defendants, so we obtained phone numbers in bulk from online white pages.
We were able to obtain phone numbers for 349 of our non-respondents; we attempted
to call them all at least once.
79 We received 22% of our responses from California, 32% from Florida,
20% from Illinois, and 27% from New Jersey. Two-thirds (64%) of our respondents
were white, 18% were African-American, 8% were Hispanic, and 7% were Asian-
American. As discussed in Part III (A) infra, with reference to their incomes and
home values, our respondents looked quite like the median persons in their states.
80 We were able to extract estimates for home value and recent value apprec-
iation for almost 90% of the addresses we selected, and we extracted square footage
and year built for about 78% of the addresses outside of New Jersey. Aside from
rough valuation estimates, Zillow.com did not have property characteristic data for
New Jersey addresses. For addresses outside New Jersey, we were also able to obtain
the number of bathrooms for 76% of the records and the number of bedrooms for
51% of the records.
81 Obviously, our low response rate makes it harder to find significant differ-
ences. The mean value ($223,063) for our respondents in Florida was noticeably
lower than the value ($299,578) for the Florida non-respondents, but due to the large




between respondents and non-respondents in terms of mean and me-
dian home purchase prices, the change in home value over the recent
30 day period, the square footage of the home, the year the home was
built, the number of bedrooms, or the number of bathrooms.
With regard to potential response bias, one concern would be that
those with medical or other exogenous causes would be more likely to
respond, wanting to tell their stories, while those who had caused their
own foreclosure by purchasing a home they could not afford or mak-
ing a bad bet on the real estate market, would be too embarrassed to
respond. The year in which people had purchased the homes now in
default would provide some indication of whether this response bias is
present. If there were such a response bias, one would expect to see
non-respondents with significantly more recent home purchases, com-
pared to the respondents who would have been able to afford their
homes until encountering a medical or other crisis. The average date
purchased for these two groups was within six months of each other,
yielding no statistically significant difference on this score (n = 1112,
71, p = .22). Thus, if there is a response bias in this data, it is too sub-
tle to be detectable with the data on hand. Nonetheless, even with
these modest tests of bias, the relatively low response rate is a cause
for concern, and readers should consider our findings conditional until
a more robust study can further test our hypotheses.
II. FINDINGS
Our surveys included both subjective data, in which respondents
themselves specify what they believed caused their foreclosures, and
purportedly objective data -- the raw facts reported by the respondents
about their situations, such as whether they currently have health in-
surance. As noted above, we also relied on data about the properties of
both respondents and non-respondents. Together, these three sources
of data complement each other and paint the picture of foreclosure.
The Standard Account
Our data shed light on what we have called, "the standard ac-
82
count" of the causes of home foreclosures. This standard account
focuses on lax lending standards, rising interest rates, and irresponsi-
ble borrowers who are walking away from upside-down mortgages on
houses they simply cannot afford. Relevant to this explanation, we
have data regarding the homeowners' self-reported causes of foreclo-
82 See discussion surrounding and sources cited in notes 3-5 supra.
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sure, their time in residence, their incomes and secured debt, and their
home equity.
Of the respondents, only one third (36%) said that increasing
mortgage payments were a factor in their default, and only one in six
(16%) reported that their loan was actually unaffordable from the be-
ginning. In contrast, three quarters of respondents (76%) reported that
their foreclosure was caused by a drop in income (57%) or unexpected
expenses (49%). As we see below, medical crises strike on both of
these fronts.
As shown in Table 2, these homeowners reported surprisingly
high household incomes, earning $52,000 annually on the median.83
This puts them squarely in the middle-class, matching the $51,000
median household income for residents of their four states, weighted
appropriately. 84 The respondents also owned fairly typical homes for
their states, with a median value of $254,023.85 In comparison, the
83 The average income was even higher, at $58,567. Unfortunately, we did
not ask respondents to distinguish between their incomes before and after their medi-
cal or other crises that caused the mortgage default. Thus, the reported figure could
represent the income they were receiving before being injured, or it could represent
their actual income now that they are unemployed. Assuming that some respondents
may have answered the question one way, and some may have answered it the other
way, one might assume that the average income, pre-medical crisis, is higher than the
reported figure, even though the average actual income, during the medical crisis, is
lower than the reported figure. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found a significant
difference in the income levels of those who had a medical cause of foreclosure.
Those without a medical cause had a mean/median income of $75,000 / $55,000,
while those with a medical cause had $52,000 / $45,000. However, in regression
models accounting for other factors, such as age, race, and state of residence, this
difference became insignificant.
84 U.S. Census Bureau, Two-Year-Average Median Household Income by
State: 2003-2005,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/income05/statemhi2.html (last visited Oct.
26, 2007). We took the 2004-2005 medians for each state, and then to estimate the
2006 value we used the same percentage change for each state in the previous period.
We then weighted each state according to the number of responses we received in
order to produce a weighted average of $50,988. On this score, the incomes for popu-
lation of the four chosen states are quite similar to the projected 2006 U.S. median
income of $47,913 (a difference of 6%). At $52,000, our respondents earn about 9%
more than the national median. Note, however, that here we are comparing the
homeowners in our sample, with all residents of their states, including those who do
not own homes. The average income of those with mortgages nationwide in 2006
was $70,667. U.S. Census Bureau, Financial Characteristics for Housing Units with a
Mortgage, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/STTable?_bm =y&-geo-id =D&-
qr name=ACS_2006_EST G00 S2506&-dsname = D&-_lang = en (last visited
Oct. 26, 2007) (note that the 2005 dataset for Table S2506 lists the median household
income for homeowners with a mortgage in 2005 as $67,852).
85 The average house was $324,213. This estimate is based on data from
Zillow.com. We also asked respondents to estimate the current value of their homes,
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median home values for residents of the four states, weighted appro-
priately, is $320,93 1.86 Together, these observations suggest that al-
though these respondents have typical incomes, their homes are ac-
tually less expensive than the median homes in their states.
Table 2: Comparison of Foreclosure Respondents




Household Incomes $52,000 $51,000
Home Values $254,023 $320,931
Ratio 4.9 6.2
We estimated the respondents' required mortgage payments based
on the total amount of secured debt and interest rate each reported,
assuming a thirty-year amortization.87 Based on this relatively crude
and they were largely consistent with the Zillow data, with a mean of $346,664 and a
median of $259,000. A paired t-test reveals that the differences are insignificant (p =
.14).
86 This is based on state medians estimated by Zillow.com, drawn at the
same time that the property-level data was drawn. The medians were: California,
$524,716; Florida, $233,743; Illinois, $231,023; and New Jersey, $357,955. Zil-
low.com estimated that the United States median home value was $263,308. This is
within 4% of our respondents' home value of $254,023, suggesting that on this meas-
ure at least, our respondents look quite like middle America. However, at $320,931,
the housing stock in the four surveyed states is 26% higher than the national median,
even though the incomes for residents of these states is only 6% higher. See supra
note 84. Thus, residents of these sampled states can be expected to have somewhat
more difficulty affording their homes, and therefore may find it more necessary to use
exotic mortgages. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. A future national study
of the causes of foreclosure might find an even larger percentage of medical causes
relative to simple issues of unaffordability.
87 The thirty-year amortization is the most typical loan type. See Federal
Housing Finance Board, Terms on Conventional Home Mortgages: Table H - Nation-
al Averages for All Major Lenders: Loans Closed,
http://www.fbfb.gov/GetFile.aspx?FilelD=6582 (last visited Sept. 29, 2007) (report-
ing average time to maturity for fixed rate loans being 29.0 years for fixed-rate loans
and 30.1 years for variable rate loans, for those closing in December 2006). This
estimate of monthly payments does not include insurance or taxes, and will be inaccu-
rate for respondents who have a longer or shorter loan period, and also fails to ac-
count for respondents who are using interest-only loans or other variations on the
standard loan model. Also, note that this benchmark is distinct from the "Total Fixed
Payment to Effective Income" benchmark that is sometimes used in the alternative,
and is therefore not a measure of total housing costs, which would include utilities
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estimate, the median homeowners in our sample spends less than one
third (32%) of their income on their estimated mortgage payments.88
This puts our respondents, all of whom are in foreclosure, just above
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) benchmark of 29%.89 Al-
most half (47%) of our respondents meet or beat the FHA benchmark.
We estimate that the median respondent can completely meet his or
her mortgage payments, and have $32,707 left over for other living
expenses.90 Nonetheless, given that these people are all in foreclosure,
we suspect that many respondents reported their normal annual in-
comes, even though their mortgage foreclosures were precipitated by
a sudden loss in income. If we had instead asked how much they
earned in the most recent weeks or months, the annualized amount
would likely have been somewhat lower. Future studies should at-
tempt to clarify this point.
We also calculated the amounts of equity that respondents had in
their homes -the home's market value minus the secured debt on the
home.9' As noted above, the traditional theory of mortgage default is
that homeowners will exercise the "option" to walk away when their
homes are worth less than they owe on them.92 However, our median
and maintenance. This is also distinct from the "Back End Ratio" which includes the
burden of servicing all the consumer's debts, including both secured and unsecured.
Rather, the present number is comparable to the FHA "Mortgage Payment Expense to
Effective Income" benchmark infra note 89, and is merely a measure of mortgage
payments to income.
88 The mean is 52%, and is drawn up because some people reported extreme-
ly low incomes, likely due to a recent loss of income. For example, there were ten
respondents that had ratios above 100% (with a maximum of 473%), meaning that
they would have had to spend every penny of income on their mortgage payments,
and they still could not have made them. Interestingly, 83% of these particular res-
pondents indicated medical causes of their foreclosures, or indicia of medical crises,
as defined below. Of those who had income-to-mortgage payment ratios above 50%,
91% cited medical causes or indicia of crises. See also note 83 supra (income data
does not distinguish between income before or after medical or other crises.)
89 HUD, 100 Questions & Answers About Buying a New Home,
http://www.hud.gov/officeslhsglsfhlbuyinglbuyhm.cfm ("according to the FHA,[
]monthly mortgage payments should be no more than 29% of gross income"), see
also 7 C.F.R. § 1980.345 (2007) (allowing a 29% ratio for home loans under the
Department of Agriculture programs); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4337 (2006) (allowing a 41%
ratio for home loans under the Veterans Administration programs).
90 The mean is $38,601. This figure is based on the estimate of mortgage
payments explained supra note 87, deducted from the respondent's self-reported
income.
91 We used the respondents' self-reported amount of secured debt and com-
pared it to both their own estimates of the home value and Zillow.com's estimate of
the home values. There was no significant difference between these methods, so the
self-reported data is discussed in the remainder of this paragraph. See note 85 supra.
92 See supra note 39-42 and accompanying text.
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respondent reports that he has about $50,000 in home equity, and the
average respondent has $85,000 in equity. 93 Given that 85% of our
respondents report having some equity in their homes, they do not
appear to be walking away from upside-down mortgages, as the stan-
dard account would suggest.
Together, these observations paint a picture of foreclosure far dif-
ferent from that described by recent news articles. With decent in-
comes, moderate home values, reasonable debt burdens, and consider-
able home equity, these homeowners appear to be able to afford their
homes, and have no reason to walk away from them. So why are they
in default? It seems that either we have a severe response bias, reveal-
ing only the situations of an unrepresentative portion of those in forec-
losure, or the standard account of home foreclosure is incorrect. As
noted in our tests of response bias above, one prediction of the stan-
dard account would be that many of those in foreclosure had pur-
chased their homes quite recently, but could not really afford them
and therefore soon defaulted. However, the homeowners in our sam-
ple, and not just the respondents, have managed to pay their mortgag-
es and avoid foreclosure for nine years on average, from the date that
they purchased the home.94 Thus, even with this small response rate,
these preliminary findings compel further inquiry into the true causes
of home foreclosure. What happened?
Self-Reported Medical Causes
In a major part of our study, we simply asked each respondent to
mark each item on a long list that they believe "caused" them to get
behind on their mortgage loans. We encouraged them to mark all that
applied. The responses show that foreclosure can arise from a wide
variety of causes including everything from natural disasters (5% of
our respondents) to divorce (13% of our respondents). However, med-
ical crises form a particularly striking pattern.
As shown in Table 3, about half of the respondents said that their
foreclosure was caused at least in part by a medical problem. The total
93 The exact figures are $85,561 mean and $49,900 median. When compared
to the home value of $324,213 mean and $254,023 median, homeowners have 26% of
home equity on average, and 20% on the median.
4 The median is five years. This data is based on the respondents' reported
dates when they purchased their homes. The mean is 1998 and the median is 2002.
The surveys were completed in December 2006 and January 2007. We also collected
the year the property was last sold from Zillow.com, but the data did not cover New
Jersey and appeared to exclude properties that were bought long ago. When a paired
T-Test is run to compare only those properties that have both estimates, the differenc-
es are insignificant (p = .08).
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figure ranges from 49% to 57%, depending on which specific causes
are counted as "medical" problems. These responses suggest that
medical crises impinge on foreclosures in multiple ways. A third of
the respondents and spouses (32%), were hit by an injury or illness.
Medical crises are ultimately financial problems--causing a quarter
(27%) to lose work, and a quarter (23%), to divert money towards
paying medical bills instead of the mortgage. There is obviously sig-
nificant overlap in these populations-for example, those with medi-
cal bills are also likely to lose work.
Table 3: Self-Reported Medical Causes of Foreclosure
any of
respondents the above
Illness or injury of self or spouse 32%
Others in family ill or injured 14%
Loss of work due to illness or injury 27%
Medical bills 23% 49%
Drugs or alcohol abuse 6%
Gambling problems 2% 50%
Birth, or other family growth 9%
Death in family 11% 57%
The abuse of drugs, alcohol, and gambling are all diagnosable
psychiatric disorders, but we do not know how many respondents
were actually diagnosed with these conditions. Whether or not these
are included as medical causes is largely inconsequential, as their in-
clusion adds a marginal one percent. Change in family size, often due
to birth, or death, typically includes medical aspects as well. Together,
these add another 7%, raising the total proportion of respondents re-
porting medical causes of their foreclosures to 57%.
This is a striking finding, suggesting a far more significant con-
nection between medical crises, and the potential loss of homes than
scholars have previously observed. In contrast, recall that Michael
Collins found that 33% of foreclosures are associated with medical
causes and Freddie Mac found that 21% of delinquencies had illness
as the primary cause.95 It is not clear whether these differences are
longitudinal, geographic, or methodological. Note that the Collins
study was limited to one city, and had a shorter list of potential medi-
cal causes for respondents to choose from. The Freddie Mac differ-




ence may well be methodological, given that they only ask borrowers
about the primary cause of their delinquency, rather than asking the
borrowers to check all contributing causes, as we did. Moreover, the
Freddie Mac data does not provide a list of the various ways in which
medical causes can contribute to foreclosure, distinguishing medical
bills from lost work for example, and therefore may elicit fewer accu-
rate responses.
The fact that more than half of respondents identify some sort of
medical cause has critical policy implications, suggesting that the
cause of the foreclosure may be temporary and unpreventable, even
though the results of foreclosure may be permanent dislocation. None-
theless, it is also worth noting that most debtors cited one, two, or
three other, completely distinct causes of foreclosure, including hav-
ing trouble managing credit and exogenous shocks, such as natural
disasters.96
With regard to objective indicia of medical crises, we found an
even stronger relationship with mortgage default, compared to these
subjective responses. Medical crises have the potential to impact ei-
ther the income side of a homeowner's budget, or the expense side, or
both.
Income Effects of Medical Crises
One very significant problem was the loss of work due to injury
or illness. Three in ten (30%) of our respondents indicated that they,
or their spouses, had missed at least two weeks of work due to illness
or injury in the two years preceding their mortgage default. At the
time of the survey, one in twelve (8%) were currently unable to work,
due to medical reasons.
In their narratives, respondents explained the link between health
and income. One wrote that, "I went off work due to medical reasons,
so the money was just not there." Another explained that, "[I was on
top [of the payments] then had emergency surgery [and] was laid up
for four months and couldn't go to work. Got behind." Likewise, a
third respondent said that, "I fell behind because my husband was
injured in a car accident[,] and went out on disability."
From a policy perspective, this connection between health crises
and lost work suggests more attention must be paid to disability insur-
96 The modal respondent cited five specific causes of their foreclosure (mean
= 4.7, median = 5). We also categorized the 21 potential causes into three categories -
medical causes, problems with credit, and exogenous causes. (The survey instrument
does not make this distinction.) The modal respondent indicated at least one cause in
all three categories (mean = 2.1, median =2).
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ance, or other ways of bridging these sorts of temporary gaps, in addi-
tion to the typical policy focus on insurance for medical bills. Federal
disability insurance, under the Social Security program, may not be
large enough, or arrive fast enough to keep people in their homes.
Even if the homeowners are perfectly healthy, the illnesses of oth-
er family members can affect the income side of the ledger. One res-
pondent explains, "I had taken time off from work when my mother
was ill." Another describes her need to care for two women in her
home. "[I] have to take care of mom, 88, and my aunt. Mom is dying,
calls 911. I am forced to take care of her."
The survey evidence bears out these anecdotes. Three quarters of
the respondents who had seniors in their homes reported medical
causes for their foreclosures, while only 46% of those without seniors
did so (p < .05). When limited to just medical problems afflicting
"other family members" besides the respondent and spouse, four-in-
ten (42%) of those with seniors cited this cause, while only one-in-ten
(9%) of the others did so. In a logistic regression model 97 controlling
for the age, sex, state, race, and income of the respondent, those with
seniors in the house are significantly (thirteen times) more likely to
report a medical cause related to "other family members. 98 From a
97 A logistic model is a statistical regression model used to estimate the in-
fluence of exogenous explanatory factors on whether a particular event occurs. Here,
we used age, sex, race, state and income of the respondent and whether there were
seniors in the household as explanatory variables, and estimated their individual and
collective influence on the likelihood that the respondent would report a medical
cause. The general approach for logistic regression involves finding a logistic func-
tion that "best fits" the observed data, which include, for each observation, whether
the event occurred (given a value of 1 if it occurred, and 0 otherwise) and the values
for all of the explanatory factors. The logarithm of the odds of the event occurring is
assumed to be a linear function of the explanatory variables, and the coefficients on
the explanatory variables are determined essentially by maximizing the product of the
probabilities the model assigns to the observed outcomes. The logistic is an increas-
ing function that takes on values strictly between 0 and 1: f(0) = e°/(1 + e9).
In the logit model, used here, the single input value 0of the logistic function is itself a
linear function of the explanatory values x1, x2, ... :
0 = ,6o + /11x 1 + 1 2 X2 +'"" Estimates of the coefficients A3, of the explanato-
ry variables are found by choosing coefficients to maximize the product of (6) for
observations where the event occurred and [l-f(6)] for observations where the event
did not occur. Values of the logistic function are commonly interpreted as probabili-
ties that the event will occur conditional on the input values of the explanatory va-
riables. For information on logit models and logistic regression generally, see G. S.
MADDALA, LiMrrED-DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS 22-
27 (Econometric Society Monographs No. 3, 1983).
98 The model as a whole had significant predictive power at .05, and the
seniors-in-household variable was itself significant which means roughly that there
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policy perspective, this finding suggests that the national Medicare
safety net may have a gap. Although Medicare pays for health care
and some prescription drugs, seniors who need daily care may be
forced to impose on relatives who must then stay home from work to
care for them. A national policy failure for senior citizens also has
implications for their adult children who must pick up the slack.
The Expenses of Medical Crises
One quarter of the respondents (23%) said that medical bills were
a cause of the foreclosure. Still, the relationship is not direct: none of
the respondents indicated that a medical creditor was actually forec-
losing on their houses after reducing the debt to a judicial lien.99 This
sort of aggressive collections practice has been the subject of recent
controversy, and has lead to some legislative responses.' °°
Instead, the interaction between medical expenses and foreclosure
is more indirect, and the policy responses must therefore be more
nuanced. Medical crises apparently cause homeowners to re-allocate
some of the money they do earn away from the mortgage and towards
medical expenses. One respondent explained that, "[i]nsurance pays
less each year. [Our] prescription medications run over $200 per
month for [the] family." The medical crises of others in the family can
be costly as well. As one respondent explained, "[m]y mother took
sick[,] and that put me behind for medical and funeral expenses."
Consistent with these narratives, over one third of the respondents
(37%) reported that they had paid more than $2,000 in un-reimbursed
medical bills in the two years before their mortgage default. At a
$1,000 threshold, this figure climbs to 42% of the respondents, which
is somewhat higher than that observed in the studies of medical bank-
ruptcies.1° Specifically, the mean/median respondent had $4,901 /
would be less than a 5% chance of observing the divergence in responses we actually
observed if the presence of seniors in the household had no actual influence on
whether a medical reason were reported.
99 Rather, 97% of the respondents indicated the foreclosing party was either
the primary mortgage lender or another mortgage lender. The remainder said it was
some other special situation, such as the house being secured by a business loan
which was defaulted.
100 See Jacoby & Warren, supra note 58, at 576 n.218 (citing cases where
judgment liens were filed by healthcare providers), 540-541 n.33-41 (showing the
legislative responses, for example, Connecticut's provision that expands the homes-
tead exemption when debts arise out of hospital services).
101 Compare this with the 27% rate found by Himmelstein et al., supra note
60. This may be due to the differences in the populations of those in bankruptcy
versus those in foreclosure, and it likely reflects a difference in time, between our
late-2006 data and their 2001 data. Medical inflation alone would make $1,000 in
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$1,250 of such un-reimbursed medical bills. For those who cited one
of the four core medical causes for their bankruptcy, their un-
reimbursed medical bills were $8,334 / $3,000, more than quintuple
those who did not. Those that said medical bills were the specific
cause of the foreclosure, faced $15,044 / $5,200 in bills. When one
considers this smallest sub-group's income during this two-year pe-
riod, these medical expenses would consume $17% of the mean in-
come and 7% on the median. Of course, it is unlikely that the medical
bills were conveniently spread across each paycheck.
These homeowners in foreclosure apparently reallocated their in-
come towards paying medical bills rather than the mortgage, and this
is cause for policy concern. From the perspective of rational choice
economics, we might assume that with a fixed amount of money to
allocate in any given month, and bills exceeding this amount, home-
owners will select which bills to pay according to whichever creditor
threatens the most negative consequences for nonpayment. It is gener-
ally more prudent to pay one's secured debts before the unsecured
debts, and consumers are routinely advised as such) °z Homeowners
must know that the threat of losing their home is a severe potential
consequence of default. Thus, when they allocate money elsewhere, it
may reflect a lack of understanding about the relative seriousness of
the consequences across these choices.
Or, the decision to pay medical bills over the mortgage might be
quite rational and intelligent. Perhaps the medical creditors have even
more practical leverage than the mortgage creditor who has a security
interest in the home. Medical providers can simply refuse further
treatment until the account is paid in full. Indeed, some medical pro-
viders may refuse to work on credit at all, requiring payment in full
before rendering medical services, as explicitly contemplated by the
Code of Medical Ethics. 103 Federal law requires that medical provid-
ers screen, and if necessary stabilize patients presenting with emer-
2001 medical expenses equivalent to about $1,300 in medical expenses at the end of
2006. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Medical Care Inflation in
2006, http://stats.bls.gov/opub/ted/2007/jul/wk5/artO5.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2007)
(deducing from percentage increases in consumer price index related to medical care
as noted in accompanying chart).
102 See, e.g., N.Y. City Dep't of Consumer Affairs, Debt Collection Guide,
www.nyc.gov/html/dca/downloads/pdf/debt.pdf at 3 ("Pay your SECURED DEBTS
first...").
103 See AMERICAN MEDICAL AssOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETmIcs, E-608,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amalpub/category/8371.html ("Although harsh
or commercial collection practices are discouraged in the practice of medicine, a
physician who has experienced problems with delinquent accounts may properly
choose to request that payment be made at the time of treatment .... ")
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gency conditions, without regard to the patient's ability to pay. t1 4
However, when it comes to getting real treatment for an underlying
ailment, there is no generally applicable legal limit to the use of leve-
rage. Such a consumer is faced with a choice between their health or
their home.
For one in twelve respondents (8%), the medical bills became so
onerous that they resorted to refinancing their homes, or taking a
home equity loan to pay their medical bills, often along with other
debt such as credit card bills.'05 Indeed, of those respondents who took
out home equity for any purpose, almost one quarter (23%) used it to
pay medical bills."°6 This medical debt, now secured by their house,
provides one reason why the median respondents owed over $50,000
more on their houses than the original purchase price.'
0 7
This conversion of unsecured medical debt to secured home debt
presents another serious policy implication. Scholars have noted that
the bankruptcy system exists as a last-resort social insurance system
for people hit with medical catastrophes, allowing them to discharge
their medical debts and get a fresh start.108 One in five (19%) of our
respondents with medical foreclosures indicated that they had de-
clared, or were considering, bankruptcy. Nonetheless, for those who
have secured their medical debts with their homes, bankruptcy is like-
ly to be much less helpful. Bankruptcy treats secured debt much diffe-
rently than it treats unsecured debt, such as amounts owed directly to
104 Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000 &
Supp. W 2007).
105 On average, respondents tended to use home equity for 1.8 purposes, in-
cluding medical bills (23%), mortgage payments (25%), living expenses (28%), other
purposes not listed (29%), repairs and renovations (31%), and credit card bills (65%).
106 Compare this to the 15% rate found by Himmelstein et al., supra note 60,
at 68.
107 The mean/median purchase price was $217,000/$137,000 while the
mean/median amount of secured debt was $261,000/$189,000. The difference in
means is $44,000; the difference in medians is $52,000. By the way, the respondent's
disclosed purchase price tracked very closely to the property data gathered from Zil-
low.com, where the mean/median last sold price was $220,000/$145,000.
'0s See generally, Adam Feibelman, Defining The Social Insurance Function
Of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 129 (2005) (Collecting
sources and concluding that, "Bankruptcy scholars generally agree that consumer
bankruptcy functions, at least in part, as a form of social insurance .... To [some
scholars], bankruptcy is effectively an 'insurer of last resort,' providing some measure
of protection to individuals who fall through cracks in other private and public institu-
tions and legal regimes designed to promote economic security.") But see Melissa B.
Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient: In Search of Non-Debt-Based Alternatives, 69 BROOK.
L. REV. 453, 462-63 (2004) (arguing that the bankruptcy system has limited
effectiveness as a system of medical insurance, in part because it provides no
prospective relief and limits repeated use).
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hospitals, doctors, or credit cards. In bankruptcy, these unsecured
debts can sometimes be discharged totally, or often times at least par-
tially, depending on the debtor's assets and income. In contrast, deb-
tors must repay every penny of secured debts, up to the liquidated
value of the collateral, and Chapter 13 bankruptcy instead merely al-
lows the debtor to re-schedule those payments.1°9 But for debts se-
cured by a home in particular, bankruptcy is even less forgiving, re-
quiring full payment according to the original mortgage contract, in
addition to any payments on the arrears through the plan.110 If you
cannot pay these secured medical bills, then you lose your house.'
Given that medical crises may be highly correlated with loss of in-
come, the chances of being able to complete such a Chapter 13 plan
may be doubtful."
12
At the very least, we might expect bankruptcy's automatic stay to
provide these debtors with a reprieve while they try to get their affairs
in order.' 3 But when medical debt is secured by a home mortgage that
'0' See 11 U.S.C.S. § 727(b) (limiting the discharge to liability on claims, not
creditors' in rem rights in collateral); § 1325(a)(5)(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007)
(requiring for approval of a Chapter 13 plan that "the value, as of the effective date of
the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not
less than the allowed amount of such claim; and [if the plan includes periodic
payments] the amount of such payments shall not be less than an amount sufficient to
provide to the holder of such claim adequate protection during the period of the
plan").
"0 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2000) (specifying that a Chapter 13 plan may
not modify the rights of holders of claims "secured only by a security interest in the
real property that is the debtor's principal residence"); see also § 1328(a)(1)
(withholding discharge from debts that have repayment schedules extending beyond
the length of the plan); see also Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Chapter 13,
at http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/chapterl 3.html
("Debts not discharged in chapter 13 include certain long term obligations (such as a
home mortgage) ... ").
11 11 U.S.C. § 5240) (The bankruptcy discharge "does not operate as an
injunction against an act by a creditor that is the holder of a secured claim, if ... such
creditor retains a security interest in real property that is the principal residence of the
debtor .. "),; See also Jacoby, supra note 108, at 464 ("Because that debt is secured,
and particularly because it is secured by the debtor's principal residence, the debtor
must pay that debt in full or she will lose her home.").
112 See Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Credi-
tor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REv. 473, 505-06 tbls. 18 & 19,
(2006) (reporting on longitudinal study of debtors who filed chapter 13 in 1994)
(finding that two thirds of those entering Chapter 13 bankruptcies did not complete
their plans).
113 S. Rep. No. 95-989 (1979) reprinted in 11 U.S.C. §362 (2000) ("The au-
tomatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy
laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection
efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a
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exhausts the debtor's equity, the reprieve may be quite temporary.
Because of the lack of equity means that the creditor also lacks "ade-
quate protection" against a decline in value of the collateral, the mort-
gage holder can immediately move the court to lift the stay and there-
by proceed with foreclosure." 14
Still, for those debtors who have some equity in their homes, and
have sufficient income to make a Chapter 13 plan work, bankruptcy
can still be an effective solution to an impending foreclosure." 15 Over
the course of a Chapter 13 plan, the debtor can gradually repay his
mortgage arrearages while also paying regular payments under the
mortgage contract. Thus, for those debtors who have temporary medi-
cal crises that do not dramatically impact their long term financial
situation, by either reducing income or diverting it to medical ex-
penses, Chapter 13 could be a way to protect their homes.
Given this legal regime, our preliminary data suggest that the
bankruptcy system may not be a very effective safety net, even as a
last resort, for those with medical crises. Given the prevalence of
medical debt secured by homes, the bankruptcy safety net has very
large holes that debtors can fall right through. Bankruptcy is no re-
placement for a comprehensive and prudent policy for financing
health care in America.
Medical Insurance
Medical insurance exists to protect consumers from financial
shocks caused by health crises. However, amongst the homeowners
that we studied, a third of them (30% for respondents, 34% for spous-
es), had no health insurance whatsoever. 116 In contrast, for the
weighted population of the four states we studied, only 17% lack in-
surance.117 This significant difference (p < .02), suggests a strong rela-
tionship between the lack of health insurance and mortgage default.
repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures
that drove him into bankruptcy.")
14 11 U.S.C. §362(d) (2000). ("[Tlhe court shall grant relief from the stay...
by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay - (1) for cause, in-
cluding the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in
interest; (2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of
this section, if - (A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and (B) such
property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.").
"1 See Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and Homeownership Risk,
2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 323,327-28 (2007).
116 For 37% of the households, either the respondent or his/her spouse lacked
health insurance.
117 The national average is 15%. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey 2005 and 2006 Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement,
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Nonetheless, it is not clear that even those who do have health in-
surance receive adequate protection from it. For those households
where both the respondent and the spouse do have insurance, the
mean/median amount of un-reimbursed, out-of-pocket medical bills
was $5,100/$2,000, while households with one or more uninsured
paid only $4,565/$500 (p > .1). Contrary to what one might expect,
those in foreclosure with health insurance pay about the same in un-
reimbursed medical bills as those without health insurance.' 18 Like-
wise, at about the same rate, both those with and without health insur-
ance say medical problems, their own, or their spouse's, caused their
foreclosure (33.8% and 30.4%, respectively).
Given that all of our respondents are in foreclosure, this is far
from an ideal study design for considering whether medical insurance
helps people in medical crises keep their houses. One explanation for
these observations is that insurance effectively helps those with low
and moderate medical bills avoid foreclosure, and thus the only in-
sured people we see in our sample are those with very high medical
bills who have surpassed their policy limits, or accumulated signifi-
cant co-pays. Another explanation for this data may be adverse selec-
tion, such that those with medical problems and higher total bills may
be more likely to be insured than others. Those who are over 65, or
have very low incomes are thereby eligible for Medicare and Medica-
id, which offset most medical expenses.! 9
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We define "significant medical distress" as occurring in those
cases where a respondent self-identified a medical cause for their fo-
reclosure, paid more than $2,000 in un-reimbursed medical bills, lost
two or more weeks of work for illness or injury, are currently unable
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/usemote/usernote3-21rev.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2007).
118 This is consistent with the findings of those in bankruptcy. See Jacoby &
Warren, supra note 58, at 553 (noting that two thirds of "medical filers" of bankrupt-
cy said all family members had insurance, and 82.7 percent of those ill or injured had
insurance at time of the interview, yet "those with private insurance at illness onset
reported higher out-of-pocket costs on average ($ 13,460) than those uninsured at
illness onset ($ 10,893)").
119 See Robert Seifert, Home Sick: How Medical Debt Undermines Housing
Security, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 325, 336 (2007) ("Non-elderly people were much more
likely to face the burdens of medical debt than people age 65 and above (47% versus
29%). Possible explanations for this are that programs for seniors such as Medicare
are largely effective in protecting them from financial difficulties, and that seniors are
relatively insulated from cutbacks in private insurance or state Medicaid programs
that provide the bulk of coverage to younger people.")
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to work for a medical reason, or used home equity to pay medical
bills. As shown in Table 4, we find that seven in ten homeowners
(69%) experienced at least some indicia of a significant medical dis-
tress in the two years preceding their foreclosures.




Self-reported medical cause 50%
Un-reimbursed med bills > $2000 37%
Lost 2+ wks, work illness /injury 30%
Currently unable to work, medical 8%
Used home equity to pay medical 13%
bills
69%
At the very least, this aggregate finding suggests that the standard
account of home foreclosure may be missing a very large portion of
the story. Those facing home foreclosure are often suffering from
illness and injury. Even when these factors do not directly cause the
foreclosure, they become part of the perfect storm of factors that push
people over the brink.
It is worth pausing to consider how these findings about medical
foreclosure relate to the standard account of the recent spike in home
foreclosures. Undoubtedly, there has been a recent increase in exotic
mortgages, predatory lending, and interest rates, while home prices
remain flat. 20 Thus, some or perhaps all of the increase in foreclo-
sures can be explained by the standard account. The question is thus,
putting aside these temporary trends, what are the causes of the base
rate of foreclosures? Our study provides only a snapshot in time, and
does not provide such a base-rate with which we can estimate the pre-
valence of medical foreclosures as a proportion of all foreclosures.
However, to the extent that these other factors were causing additional
foreclosures during our study period of December 2006 and January
2007, we should expect the base rate to reflect an even higher percen-
tage of foreclosures with medical causes. Of course, both the medical
causes and the "standard account" causes are subject to policy inter-
ventions, which may in the future change (and hopefully decrease) the
rate of foreclosures.
120 See Alternative Mortgage Products, supra note 2, at 7-10.
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The "standard account" causes of foreclosure are not completely
independent of medical foreclosures. In many cases, various factors
combine to push borrowers over the edge, into financial ruin., 21 Thus,
in raw numbers, the spike in foreclosures due to these other causes
might also cause a spike in medical foreclosures. Finally, given the
observed relationship between medical crises and foreclosures, it is
possible that changes in the health care economy during these same
few years may have contributed to the spike in foreclosures.
22
Before turning to questions of policy, it is worth emphasizing that
our findings are the result of a preliminary study of the medical causes
of home foreclosure, one that suffers from a relatively low response
rate. Notwithstanding our checks of response bias, it is possible that
the experiences of our respondents are not representative of the whole.
So, as we begin to contemplate the meaning of these findings for law
and policy, we do so conditionally, on the assumption that these find-
ings can and will be replicated in more comprehensive future studies.
The question is, if these observations are accurate, what do they
mean?
Our most striking observations begin with the realization that
most of those suffering medical foreclosures are solidly in the middle
class, with apparently affordable homes, and health insurance to boot.
Thus, none of the handy bromides are apt. Simply tightening mort-
gage lending standards, or providing health insurance to more Ameri-
cans, is unlikely to solve the problem of medical foreclosures. Instead,
this study contributes to a growing awareness that the middle class in
America is financially insecure, both because they are living too close
to the margins, and because they are now exposed to risks that can
push them over the edge.123 For example, recall that those who cited
121 See note 96 supra.
122 See, e.g., Hearing on Economic Challenges Facing Middle Class Families
Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (Jan. 31, 2007) (statement of
Diane Rowland, Executive Vice President of Kaiser Family Foundation, available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=5415 ("From
2000 - 2006, the cumulative increase in premiums for employer-sponsored insurance
was 87 percent compared to a 20 percent increase in wages and 18 percent increase in
overall inflation .... Since 2000, the cumulative increase in premiums is over 4 times
the increase in wages for non-supervisory employees .... Between 2001 and 2005,
the share of middle-income employees in firms with employer-based coverage
dropped from 82.4 percent to 78.5 percent and, in turn, their uninsured rate grew from
13.4 percent to 16 percent").
123 See generally WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 56 (arguing that American
families have almost all of their income locked up in necessities and have little in
reserve for crises); JACOB HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE ASSAULT ON
AMERICAN JOBS, FAMILIES, HEALTH CARE, AND RETIREMENT AND How You CAN
FIGHT BACK (2006) (arguing that the traditional pillars of financial security, the fami-
20081
HEALTH MATRIX
medical bills as the cause of their foreclosure were hit, on average,
with over $15,000 in uncovered expenses. This sort of "exogenous
shock" to their personal budgets was apparently too much for them to
handle, and it pushed them into foreclosure. In this light, medical fo-
reclosures are symptoms of larger policy problems.
Given the complexity of the problem of middle class financial in-
security, there is no simple solution. Enhancing real wages, minimiz-
ing the middle class tax burden, encouraging savings, and creating
various governmental safety nets are all salient responses, but beyond
the scope of the present study.
Nonetheless, there are specifically legal responses available to
policy makers to address the narrower problem of medical foreclo-
sures themselves. For one thing, this study suggests that the public
discussion of universal health insurance needs to be sensitive to not
just the problem of un-insurance, but also under-insurance. To be ef-
fective, health insurance must be done right - a policy with low caps
or slow reimbursements may not keep people in their homes. Moreo-
ver, this suggests that in addition to insurance for medical bills, more
attention needs to be paid to medical disability insurance, and home
care insurance. Our respondents indicate that medical crises affect
both the income and expenses side of a consumer's ledger, yet much
of the contemporary discussions about healthcare reform focuses only
on the latter.
Putting health policy aside, the problem of medical foreclosures
could instead be addressed by housing policy and the mortgage indus-
try. One potential response is to create a public or private insurance
system to prevent the problem. Such insurance could pay the mort-
gage during a verifiable medical crisis in the borrowers' household,
allowing those with only a temporary problem to overcome it without
losing their homes in the process. For those with permanent medical
problems, the insurance could provide a more orderly process of di-
vesting themselves of the asset, while preserving whatever equity they
have. 124 Alternatively, for those with permanent disabilities, the debt
could simply be forgiven, as is done for federal student loans. 125
ly and the workplace, no long provide as much economic stability).
124 See Stark, supra note 14, at 678-80 (proposing a birfurcated process,
whereby those with significant equity in their properties would be allowed to sell the
property "in a manner which is commercially reasonable and designed to produce a
selling price close to the fair market value of the property").
125 See U.S. Department of Education, Repaying Your Student Loans, at 23
n.l available at http://studentaid.ed.gov/
students/attachments/siteresources/RepayingYourStudentLoansEnglish2003_04.pdf
("Beginning July 1, 2002, a borrower who is determined to be totally and permanent-
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Preventing medical foreclosure is a positive sum game for the
lenders, the homeowners, and the public. 26 Therefore, we could ex-
pect these three interests to be willing to invest together to purchase
such insurance. If rational borrowers were told ex ante that half of all
foreclosures are caused by medical crises, then, in theory, they should
be willing to pay some amount for insurance to protect themselves
from a medical foreclosure. Lenders, in return, should be willing to
offer lower origination fees and/or interest rates, reflecting the re-
duced risk of default for the loans of such insured borrowers, which
would thereby partially offset the cost of the insurance. 27 Finally,
given the negative externalities of foreclosures, the government would
have an interest in subsidizing this insurance, at least by making it
tax-deductible.128 Although attractive in principle, any such voluntary
insurance program will be severely hampered by problems of bounded
rationality. 2 9 Given the pernicious effects of optimism bias, home-
buyers are unlikely to purchase such insurance, even if given the op-
tion to do so.
It should be noted that loan servicers already seek to modify
mortgages, or grant forbearances when borrowers face a short-term
financial crunch, so as to avoid the costs and risks associated with
proceeding to a foreclosure sale.' 30 Indeed, many of our respondents
ly disabled will have his or her loan placed in a conditional discharge period for three
years from the date the borrower became totally and permanently disabled. During
this conditional period, the borrower doesn't have to pay principal or interest. If the
borrower continues to meet the total-and-permanent disability requirements during,
and at the end of, the three-year conditional period, the borrower's obligation to repay
the loan is canceled.")
126 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
127 See Stark, supra note 14, at 641 (suggesting that without added security,
"[l]enders will pass along the costs associated with delinquent mortgages to new
borrowers in the form of higher loan fees or higher interest rates.").
128 Alternatively, the government could provide a form of mortgage insurance
directly to borrowers instead of, or as a supplement to, privately purchased mortgage
insurance. The United Kingdom has such a two-policy system, but the complexity
has hindered its effectiveness. See Janet Ford & Deborah Quilgars, Failing Home
Owners? The Effectiveness of Public and Private Safety-nets, 16 HoUSING STUD. 147,
160-61 (2001) (explaining that the two-policy system fails to provide housing security
as hoped, especially for the poorest homeowners).
129 Amongst other problems, homeowners are likely to suffer from optimism
bias, as they will tend to assume the medical foreclosures will happen to others, not
themselves. See, Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive
Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1660-61 (1998) (describing empirical findings
that individuals tend to under-estimate the likelihood of suffering an automobile acci-
dent).
130 See, Amy Crew Cutts and Richard K Green, Innovative Servicing Tech-
nology: Smart Enough to Keep People in Their Houses? in BUILDING ASSETS,
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likely worked out some such arrangement to stay in their homes.' 3'
However, such an offer may come only after the lender has initiated
foreclosure proceedings, which incurs thousands of dollars of legal
fees that are passed on to the borrower even if he or she ultimately
cures the default. 32 Thus, homeowners should be advised to begin
negotiating with their lenders much sooner, before foreclosure pro-
ceedings are initiated. Still, such negotiations will be of limited value
to the homeowner who has no real choice about whether to default,
since a servicer is free to proceed with foreclosure whenever it is eco-
nomically rational to do so, without regard for the borrower's reasons
for delinquency. Without some sort of legal entitlement to protect
him, the borrower has little or no negotiation power.' 33 Policymakers
should explore ways to further incentivize mortgage servicers to deal
with those suffering from short-term trigger events, so that these bor-
rowers can avoid losing their homes, and avoid the onerous costs in-
volved in such an involuntary transaction. In crude terms, if laws
make it more expensive for lenders to consummate foreclosure, for
example, by requiring that they use a judicial remedy, lenders will be
compelled to instead negotiate with the marginal borrowers, some of
whom will be able to re-instate their mortgages after a temporary set-
BUILDING CREDIT: CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 348, (Nicolas P.
Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky, eds., 2005), available at
http://www.freddiemac.connews/pdf/fmwp_0403-servicing.pdf.
131 See Stark, supra note 14, at 663 ("[O]nly a third or fewer of the
foreclosure cases filed ended in a foreclosure sale."). A future study should explore
whether there is a significant difference in the outcomes for homeowners depending
on the reasons that caused their foreclosures in the first place. One might hypothesize
that those entering default because interest rates have adjusted upwards might be
more likely to actually lose their homes, while those suffering a temporary medical
crisis may be more likely to negotiate a deal that saves their homes.
See e.g, Brown v. Lynn 385 F. Supp. 986, 993 (N.D. Ill., 1974) ("[Tlhe
mortgagees' collection attorneys are apparently charging high fees for what appears to
be the mailing of a collection notice threatening foreclosure. Unless the mortgagor
pays all existing deficiencies as well as these attorney's fees, the mortgagees institute
foreclosure proceedings which apparently give rise to even greater costs and attor-
ney's fees. Since, under [state law], the only defense to a foreclosure is the tender of
the entire arrearage, plus all costs, fees and expenses, the mortgagors, who are already
under severe financial strain, find it virtually impossible to reinstate. The initial refer-
rals [by the mortgagees to the attorneys] thus appear to seal the mortgagors' fates....
[Ilf [the plaintiff's] allegations are true, and they are in fact losing their homes largely
because of attorney's fees, we find such conduct to be unconscionable."), discussed in
HUD supra note 6 at 23.
133 See generally, Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (explaining how
legal entitlements provide bargaining power to parties, even without intervention by
the courts to enforce those laws in the particular dispute).
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back. Of course, any such costs will presumably be spread to all bor-
rowers ex ante.
Under the status quo, mortgage disability insurance is already
available on the private market.134 Yet, only eight percent of our res-
pondents indicated that they were currently unable to work because of
a medical reason, and we do not know how many of these had such
insurance. Even this small minority, who may have been eligible to
receive such insurance benefits if they had bought such contracts ex
ante, found themselves in foreclosure. Thus, to be effective, medical
foreclosure insurance would likely need to be broader in scope, more
widely held, and perhaps have quicker benefits than traditional disa-
bility insurance.
As an alternative to the insurance response, the government could
create a law staying foreclosure proceedings during verifiable medical
crises. 135 Similarly, during World War I, Congress was concerned
about soldiers and sailors who were returning from combat to find that
their homes had been foreclosed. Congress turned to then Major John
Wigmore, later Dean of Northwestern University Law School and
author of the renowned treatise, Wigmore on Evidence.136 Wigmore
drafted, and Congress passed, The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act of 1918, which stayed all home foreclosures against service-
members while they were on active duty. 137 This Act expired at the
134 See e.g., STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. CO., MORTGAGE DISABILITY
INCOME INSURANCE, http://www.statefarm.com/insurance/disability/mortgdi.asp
(last visited Oct. 28, 2007).
135 Similarly, Kansas already has a law that stays wage garnishment proceed-
ings during two months following a medical crisis that causes a loss of work. KAN.
STAT. ANN. 60-2310(c) (2005) ("If any debtor is prevented from working at the deb-
tor's regular trade, profession, or calling for any period greater than two weeks be-
cause of illness of the debtor or any member of the family of the debtor, and this fact
is shown by the affidavit of the debtor, the provisions of this section shall not be
invoked against any such debtor until after the expiration of two months after recov-
ery from such illness."). It is unclear how valuable this provision is to a debtor, given
that one who is not working is also not likely earning wages, and therefore has noth-
ing to garnish.
136 See generally Terry M. Jarrett, The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act: Im-
portant New Protections for Those in Uniform, 60 J. Mo. B. 174 (2004).
137 Id. The Act's mortgage foreclosure provisions are now codified at 50
U.S.C. app. § 533 (2000 & Supp. III 2005). "Mortgage lenders may not foreclose, or
seize property for a failure to pay a mortgage debt, while a service member is on
active duty or within 90 days after the period of military service unless they have the
approval of a court. In a court proceeding, the lender would be required to show that
the service member's ability to repay the debt was not affected by his or her military
service." U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Questions & Answers for Reservists,
Guardsmen and Other Military Personnel,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfhlinsc/qasscral.cfm (last visited Oct. 7, 2007)
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end of World War I, but Congress re-enacted it during World War II,
without expiration, and has more recently expanded its reach. 38 There
are two obvious motivations for this sort of stay provision. First is a
sense of reciprocal obligation to those serving the country. If they are
willing to put their lives on the line for us, the least we can do is pro-
tect their homes while they are gone. Second is a sense of sheer prac-
ticality and basic fairness. A soldier serving abroad is effectively in-
capacitated, unable to appear in court stateside, and with little control
over his own finances.1 39 Both of these points would seem to be par-
ticularly trenchant in a time of conscripted service, where soldiers are
involuntarily removed from their stateside professions.
Homeowners suffering medical crises are obviously different in
important ways compared to soldiers serving abroad. While there is
not such a tangible sense of reciprocal obligation to homeowners as
such, there may be a more philosophical commitment to reciprocity,
in the sense of a social contract. After all, a medical emergency could
strike any of us, and a catastrophic one could put nearly any of us at
risk of losing our homes. There may be reasonable disagreement
about how robust the social contract should be, but perhaps this is
close to the bare minimum. 140 Even if our society is not willing to pay
for your medical expenses, we may at least let you keep your home
while you try to pay your own way. From the perspective of practical-
ity and fairness, those in medical foreclosure share one feature with
service members - their mortgage defaults are often involuntary. The
positive law could distinguish between those who breach a contract
voluntarily versus those who made a contract in good faith, but en-
countered obstacles that made performance impossible.141 The means
(summarizing 50 U.S.C. app. § 533). The Act also has provisions for renters. See 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 531, 535. Likewise, the argument for protecting those in medical
foreclosure could be extended to protect renters as well.
138 The Act was amended in 2003, adding additional protections, including a
mandate for the initial 90-day stay of proceedings rather than merely allowing court
discretion in whether to impose the stay, as in the original act. Pub. L. No. 108-189, §
202(b)(1) 117 Stat. 2835.
139 This concern for the servicemember's financial situation is evident in the
Act's provision that a lender may move the court to lift the stay if it can show that the
servicemember's finances are not in fact adversely impacted by his service in the
military. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 137.
140 Compare R. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE? (1997) (using the veil of ignorance to argue against a positive right to health
care), with Russell Korobkin, Determining Health Care Rights from Behind a Veil of
Ignorance, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 801 (1998) (using the veil of ignorance to argue for
such a right).
if, This is not to say that the law already makes such a distinction. See Ri-
chard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48
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test of the revised bankruptcy code reflects this sensibility; those who
are able to repay their debts should do so, while the rest will be forgi-
ven. 142
Still, the proposed stay need not go all the way to discharging the
debts of those in medical foreclosure, at least not for those whose
medical crisis is temporary. The stay rule could operate on principles
similar to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, requiring borrowers to pay all of
their disposable income towards their mortgage, but preventing the
lender from taking the property during the medical crisis.143 The unpa-
id portions of the mortgage payments would continue to accrue as
secured debt, which would eventually be paid off by the borrower, or
by a future purchaser of the property. Such a policy would nonetheless
have a cost for lenders in cases where there is insufficient equity and
an ultimate default, and this cost presumably would be passed on to
the borrowers ex ante. If all borrowers are thereby paying the costs of
protection from medical foreclosure, the system looks quite like the
insurance program described above, only that it is now mandatory,
avoiding the problems of bounded rationality.'
44
As an alternative to this form of mandated risk-spreading, the
government could instead provide mortgage guarantees, loans, or
grants that kick in only when a borrower avails himself of the medical
tolling provisions.145 For example, the Pennsylvania Foreclosure Pre-
ARIZ. L. REv. 735, 745-46 (2006) (addressing wrongfulness and the strict liability
components of contract law).
142 11 U.S.C. § 707. This test is a crude measure of ability to repay debts
because it is retrospective, rather than prospective.
143 Of course declaring bankruptcy is also an option, but bankruptcy may be
unnecessarily drastic, expensive, and consequential for these homeowners. See
generally Jacoby, supra note 108 (discussing the consequences of medical-related
debt and assessing alternatives to bankruptcy in the health enviroment). A lighter
weight, more tailored solution could be more efficacious. As noted above, bankrupt-
cy is particularly unhelpful for those who have secured their debts with their homes.
See supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text.
144 See Schill, supra note 8, at 490 ("[M]ortgagor protection laws [function]
as a form of insurance against the adverse effects of default and foreclosure. Viewed
in this way, mortgagor protections might promote economic efficiency, even though,
as an ex post matter, they are not frequently exercised by borrowers."). Schill also
provides empirical evidence that mortgagor protections, such as prohibitions on defi-
ciency judgments and statutory rights of redemption, have a modest effect on interest
rates. Id.
145 One advantage of requiring mortgage lenders to spread the costs of this
stay provision, rather than the federal and/or state governments, is that lenders would
only spread the costs to other homeowners. If the federal government were to guaran-
tee these loans using their general treasuries, it would have the redistributive effect of
forcing renters who are taxpayers to further subsidize homeowners (as they currently
do with the various tax subsidies for homeowners). This inequity could be minimized
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vention Act 91 of 1983 includes a Homeowners' Emergency Mortgage
Assistance Program (HEMAP), which provides a temporary stay of
foreclosure proceedings so that homeowners experiencing temporary
financial disruptions can apply for special loans that cover their mort-
gage payments for up to 24 months or $60,000.'46 In its first twelve
years in existence, the program has disbursed $384 million to 37,100
homeowners, out of 145,500 applications, and the program recoups its
expenses through loan repayments and secondary liens, along with
state appropriations. 147 Further study may reveal that this program is
an effective model for legislation nationwide.
Methodologically, this entire study is merely a preliminary ap-
proach to the collection of empirical data about the causes of mort-
gage foreclosures, and will need to be replicated, and expanded in
future studies. Notwithstanding all the knowledge that can be gleaned
by inferential statistics, we found that a great deal can be learned by
simply asking homeowners about the causes of their foreclosures.
Although the respondents may be susceptible to various biases, and
may lack important macro-level information available to social scien-
tists, these homeowners are, at a practical level, in the best position to
know what happened to them and what it means to them. Allowing
them to tell their stories, and then listening, is a way of enfranchising
them in the policymaking process. Future work needs to develop
higher confidence that the respondents are representative of all those
in foreclosure, and that the study does not suffer from a self-selection
bias of respondents.
Altogether, these findings suggest that the standard account of
mortgage foreclosure is missing a large portion of the story. Mortgage
foreclosures are not just the results of bad loans, bad properties, or bad
borrowers. Instead, many mortgage foreclosures are the result of un-
predictable medical disruptions that impact both the incomes and the
expenses of family finances.
if renters also received some protections from medical evictions in a similar program.
146 Pennsylvania Foreclosure Prevention Act 91 of 1983, 35 PA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1680.401c, .405c(f) (West 2003); Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, Penn-
sylvania Foreclosure Prevention Act 91 of 1983 - Homeowners' Emergency Mort-
gage Assistance Program (HEMAP),
http://www.phfa.org/consumers/homeowners/hemap.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
147 Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, supra note 146; Cmty. Affairs
Dep't, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Homeowner's Emergency Mortgage Assistance
Program (HEMAP), TECHNICAL BRIEFS, Nov. 2006, available at
http://www.phil.frb.org/cca/capubs/tech-brief-nov-2006.pdf.
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